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Science often progresses faster than regulation, and retroactive ethically linked rules have been a persistent
issue in stem cell research. Proposed NIH funding rules are retroactive. Legal history and ethical analysis
show why there should be a strong presumption that such new rules should be only prospective, in any
area of scientific research.The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has
just proposed draft embryonic stem cell
(ESC) funding rules that, if adopted
following an open comment period, few ex-
isting cell lines would meet. This constraint
is due to new, specific mandates for
informed consent. The proposed rules do
not explicitly provide research funding for
existing so-called Presidential ESC lines
fundable under President George W. Bush,
although some of these lines may yet be
eligible under the current drafted regula-
tions. Existing NIH grants are also not
protected, raising the possibility that
ongoing experiments must be interrupted,
and new cell lines developed, for current
research to continue. Nor do the proposed
rules promise funding to the many ESC cell
linesderivedafter 2001 according to ethical
protocols approved by institutional review
boards (IRBs), operating under federal
regulations. Furthermore, funding for cell
lines derived according to the so-called
‘‘NAS guidelines’’ (Committee on Guide-
lines for Embryonic Stem Cell Research,
National Research Council, 2005) or the
‘‘ISSCR guidelines’’ (Human Embryonic
Stem Cell Research Task Force, Interna-
tional Society for Stem Cell Research,
2006) will also be in jeopardy based on the
proposed NIH requirements for consent
documentation. The NAS and ISSCR
guidelines were developed after extensive
multidisciplinary deliberation, and public
consultation over several years. The result-
ing guidelines are considered models of
self-regulation, and they have been adop-
ted widely across the global research
community. Existing IRB reviews and the
established guidelines ought, therefore, to
be given significant weight when assessing
the ethical provenance of an ESC line.Prospectively applied, the proposed
NIH rules as they stand would present
a challenge to the field. But retroactively
applied, the draft regulations would create
a tectonic shift: previously, only certainold
lines were fundable, and now—conceiv-
ably—only certain new lines will be, and
there will continue to be no federal funding
available for research using cells created
ethically since 2001. Important research
will need to be repeated, and assays and
data rebuilt. As currently outlined, it’s as
if the last 8 years of cell line creation and
ethical self-regulation have just vanished,
to be replaced by a new funding structure
that does not give weight to the existing
science, ethics, self-regulation, donor
intentions, or diverse cell lines. Resolving
this situation is critically important for
stem cell research. But the broader prin-
ciple—should government guidance be
retroactive?—is vital for all areas of scien-
tific research.
Informed Consent under the
Proposed Funding Rules
The proposed rules require nine consent
elements to be documented in the written
informed consent form for donors who
release embryos for research purposes.
Some requirements are traditional, and
well-established in the research commu-
nity, such as that consent was voluntary
and the donor was aware of alternatives.
Other requisites are newer, and while
they may have merit, such as prohibiting
directed donation and barring donors
from receiving any financial gain from
patents or products, these issues have
yet to be publicly debated in depth. In addi-
tion, institutions must assure compliance
in applications and progress reports andCell Stemmaintain the connection between non-
compliance and potentially severe penal-
ties (civil False Claims Act penalties and
damages; criminal prosecution). Institu-
tions will presumably be conservatively
risk averse. Institutions must also assure
that conditions in IVF clinics are docu-
mented, including at least two consents—
at the time of seeking reproductive
services and at the time of donation. While
full consent at the time of donation is
essential, neither the NAS nor the ISSCR
guidelines require, in all cases, that there
have been a previous consent form that
avoids mention of hESC, as required by
the proposed NIH rules. Consent must
also have been revocable until the time
embryos were ‘‘used in research,’’ which,
while reflective of some guidelines, can
be problematic for deidentified donations,
depending on how ‘‘use in research’’ is
defined. Finally, clinics must have had poli-
cies in place to ensure that medical care
was unaffected by the decision to donate,
and uninfluenced by researchers or
inducements. In this case, the key concern
is not the avoidance of influence per se,
which is important, but whether that prac-
tice must be reflected in a written policy,
instead of, for example, corporate or
departmental separation of researchers
from the IVF clinicians.
Sugarman and Siegel (2008) and Lo
et al. (2009) have persuasively argued that
determining whether a given ESC line can
be used ethically based solely on an
informed consent form—the approach of
the proposed NIH funding rules—is
mistaken. Instead, contextual evidence
of the consent process may be sufficient
when an informed consent form does
not itself document all elements thatCell 4, June 5, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 479
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inquiry is whether ‘‘investigators acted
substantially in accord with underlying
ethical principles (e.g., respect for
autonomy).’’ Contextual evidence may
include written policies, forms, and IRB
minutes, but also expert opinion about
consent standards of the time, investi-
gator interviews, and knowledge of local
review processes. For existing lines, the
Sugarman/Siegel/Lo approach would
reconcile the novelty of new ethical
requirements with a realistic test about
whether line provenance substantially
meets ethical fundamentals. However,
the authors’ contextual approach is
precluded by the present NIH proposal,
which explicitly requires that specified
elements be in the informed consent
form itself, and that IVF practices and
policy must be prospectively docu-
mented. Since the Sugarman/Siegel/Lo
approach is thus unavailable to evaluate
existing lines, we must confront the ques-
tion of whether the blanket retroactivity of
the proposed funding rules is justified.
Should the Proposed Ethical Rules
Be Retroactive?
Retroactivity has been a persistent issue in
stem cell research, and perhaps anywhere
science progresses faster than regulation:
when regulations catch up, there can be
a disruptive effect on science that has
been deemed fully ethical till that time.
The NAS guidelines, for example, imposed
new consent requirements for gamete
donations and tissues for somatic cell
nuclear transfer (SCNT)and did not ‘‘grand-
father’’ existing well-characterized somatic
cell lines that might have been suitable
sources for disease-specific SCNT-
created stem cell lines. Recently, Robert
Streifferaccused the NIH of ignoring impor-
tant consent fundamentals with respect to
the Presidential lines; when the head of
the NIH stem cell effort replied that Streiffer
was imposing a retroactive standard,
Streiffer responded that related standards
had been discussedbyvarious committees
over time, and his arguments ‘‘derive[d]
from’’ principles long recognized, even if
in varying form (Baker, 2008). The result
was uncomfortably inconclusive; review
committees became divided about how
to handle the criticized lines—whether to
forbid them, permit them with special justi-
fication, or permit them completely as
having met then-prevailing IVF standards.480 Cell Stem Cell 4, June 5, 2009 ª2009 EThe field will face the same issues with
iPSCs. Aalto-Seta¨la¨ and colleagues have
observed that new uses for iPSCs raise
many consent issues, including chimeric
uses, genetic modification, large-scale
genome sequencing, transplantation, and
reproductive research—uses not tradition-
ally included in basic tissue consents
except in research directed to such
purposes (Aalto-Seta¨la¨ et al., 2009). What
iPSC uses will be permitted when consent
documentation is absent, or incomplete,
for the parental somatic cell lines? The
scientific case for disease-specific studies
maybecompelling;should retroactive rules
prevent such use?
Anglo-American law has debated retro-
activity for centuries, and its insights are
illuminating. U.S. law is historically hostile
to retroactive enactments. A presumption
of legal prospectivity has been a continuing
feature, along with explicit constitutional
constraints on retroactivity in certain
areas. Common law opposed retroactivity
because of absolutist monarchs, who
occasionally attempted to punish treason,
and take land and property, under new
edicts applied retroactively. In the U.S.,
enlightenment commitments to personal
liberty, individual property, and a just
society fostered eloquently expressed
protests against retroactivity, and not just
for criminal laws. Retroactive laws were
considered a form of ‘‘oppression,’’ char-
acteristic of ‘‘Roman princes,’’ which the
‘‘fundamental laws of every free govern-
ment’’ would condemn (Dash v. Van
Kleeck, 1811; Terrett v. Taylor, 1815).
Neither Terrett nor Dash, nor the many
other such cases of the time, was a fund-
ing case; widespread government fund-
ing is more recent. In varying contexts
since then, retroactivity has had ups and
downs. But underlying values continue:
the presumption of prospectivity survives,
except where courts must respect
express or implied Congressional state-
ments of retroactivity. Even then, retroac-
tivity must pass constitutional muster.
Retroactive versus Prospective
Laws
In a much-quoted definition among
jurists, Justice Story of the U.S. Supreme
Court, in the 1814 Society for Propagating
the Gospel decision, defined a retroactive
law as one that ‘‘takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing
law, or creates a new obligation, imposeslsevier Inc.a new duty, or attaches a new disability in
respect to transactions or considerations
already past’’ (Society for Propagating
the Gospel v. Wheeler, 1814).
Later cases clarified that laws can be
retroactive in two ways. First, they can
explicitly affect past conduct, such as by
making a past act criminal, or through
a retroactive effective date. Second,
they can be retroactive by changing the
future consequences of past actions.
Thus, one way the current proposed NIH
rules are retroactive is that grants previ-
ously awarded to use certain Presidential
lines are apparently no longer eligible for
funding, despite the previous grant agree-
ment and expectations of scientists.
There are also two ways in which a law
may be purely prospective. First, it may
apply explicitly only to future transactions.
A second kind of prospectivity is ‘‘grand-
fathering,’’ i.e., an explicit recognition
that new rules should not disadvantage
existing categories. Grandfathering can
be conditional or unconditional, and either
unlimited or limited in time or scope.
Waiving new consent rules for all existing
stem cell lines derived from surplus IVF
embryos, provided they met ethical stan-
dards of the time, would be one form
of grandfathering. Alternatively, grandfa-
thering might be conditioned on IRB or
ESCRO approval, or it might limit grandfa-
thering for a time, say 3 years, so that
a suitable number and diversity of new
lines could be developed using new
consent standards.
What’s Wrong with Making the
Proposed NIH Rules Retroactive?
Why would retroactive application of the
proposed consent rules be problematic?
First of all, not everyone may agree with
the rules, as currently drafted, and so
making them retroactive worsens the
situation. Scientists might believe that the
NIH is misbalancing competing interests
between scientific benefit and consent
standards, or some ethicists may think
the consent standards are wrong in other
ways. But I will leave those issues for
others to discuss, as there are special
problems with retroactivity itself to con-
sider at present.
First, affected parties are deprived of
any notice that would allow them to
conform their conduct to new require-
ments. For example, it is too late for IVF
clinics to incorporate new consent terms
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particularly if deidentifying to protect
privacy prevents donor recontact and re-
consent. It is too late for scientists to
rewrite protocols and turn back the clock
on derivation research. What might have
been possible, if known in advance, is
now impossible.
Second, as reflected in Justice Story’s
comment, retroactive rules violate the
sense that certain rights are ‘‘vested’’;
vested means that the rights deserve
special respect because of their duration,
compliance with rules and expectations
of the time, or government’s or others’
conduct in confirming them. Affected
parties acquire a certain ‘‘right,’’ such as
to conduct funded research with a given
cell line, if government, society, or ethical
culture confirmed at the time that their
behavior was ethically adequate. We’ll
see how this applies below.
Third, retroactive provisions undercut
reliability, not just as to their particular
subject matter, but as to the whole system
of regulation: if retroactive provisions are
permitted, then even the new retroactive
rules, and in fact any rule, is subject to
being overturned through yet one more,
later, retroactive rule. Will the new NIH
rules, in whatever form they are finalized,
be rewritten retroactively with every new
administration, or scientific advance?
Fourth, retroactive rules, even stated
neutrally, are easily targeted to dispropor-
tionally disadvantage known populations.
‘‘Neutral’’ rules that shift funding from one
politically favored group to another are
easier given retrospective data. I do not
think that is a tenable claim about the
current NIH proposal—to the contrary.
But we have just emerged from an era
of politics directed at control of science.
So this is important: are retroactive rules
a wise course for government regulation
of science under diverse political leader-
ship?
Finally, recall how Common Law saw
retroactive laws as potentially inconsis-
tent with free societies. In this regard,
jurist Lon Fuller observed that absent
special circumstances, such as fixing
legal mistakes, a retroactively applicable
rule is ‘‘a monstrosity,’’ a deviation from
law’s fundamental morality of prospective
enforcement, so that even enactment by
proper organs of government could not
truly make it a ‘‘law’’ (Fuller, 1969). We’ll
return to this also.It is useful to translate these points into
familiar ethical terms. There are autonomy
interests of donors. But this consideration
is ambiguous: even if the proposed
consent requirements protected donors
better, some existing cell lines would be
made useless, even if donors would
have wished them used. There are impor-
tant interests in maximizing stem cell
resources for social benefit. Defining this
interest is also ambiguous if, giving the
proposed rules the benefit of any doubt,
there is a trumping social benefit from
using only stem cell lines that pass new
ethical muster. However, it is difficult to
see what ethical superiority lies in the
documentary requirement that provi-
sions be restricted to information on
the informed consent form, if equivalent
provisions and participant acceptance
are as well documented via contextual
evidence.
There is a justice interest in treating like
cases alike going forward, so that all fund-
ing decisions (and grantees) are subject to
the same rules. But not all cell lines are
alike: those ESC lines created in accord
with rigorous ethical rules of the time
deserve to be treated differently from lines
(like the Hwang lines of several years ago)
created with less attention to ethical
fundamentals or prevailing standards.
There is also a justice interest in
keeping commitments to scientists who
received grant awards. In addition, it is
unjust to create new IVF consent rules
to which, being retroactive, one has no
opportunity to conform. Moreover, while
scientists could not reasonably claim
a ‘‘vested right’’ to funding (except under
existing grants), it is not an overstatement
that scientists and donors could reason-
ably rely, for an ethical stamp of approval,
on (1) government designation of Presi-
dential lines (recently reapproved by
government); (2) federally regulated IRB
review; and (3) review under NAS and
ISSCR standards, standards to which
the NIH has not objected and, I must
believe, the NIH would not now condemn.
So why can’t scientists rely on lines that
fall into these categories?
Finally, there is an issue of global
justice. The new rules apply, as drafted,
to ESC lines created anywhere in the
world. Lo et al. (2009) have suggested
a method for evaluating cell lines that
would not meet local (evolving) standards,
through reference to core principles, butCell Stemthe present NIH proposal would preclude
that approach. Unless new U.S. IVF
consent procedures are implemented
internationally, the U.S. will make no
funded contribution to the use, character-
ization, and development of ESC lines
from abroad. Given the geographic differ-
ences in prevalence of genetic diseases,
any preclusion of international cell lines
is perhaps a tragic message for U.S.
investment in nondomestic health.
Ethics scholars have added ‘‘commu-
nity’’ as a fourth ethical factor, where
one must consider the implications of
a proposal on the wishes, risks, and bene-
fits for specific communities (Emanuel
and Weijer, 2005). Here, ‘‘community’’
relates to the historic view that retroac-
tivity violates fundamental interests of
free societies, which are broader than
individual autonomy interests or social
goals of stem cell funding itself. While it
has been a long road, the ethics and
scientific communities have converged
around a set of ethical standards and
review procedures, as evidenced by the
broad adoption of both NAS and ISSCR
guidelines, among others. The proposed
NIH rules discount the national and inter-
national community investment and
interest in those standards, as well as
the community processes that led to
them.
There is another way of looking at the
community question: At what point do
ethics statements represent a sufficient
social consensus that it becomes fair for
a community or government to charge
individuals with retroactive obedience
through regulations? Is it when some ethi-
cists (or lawyers, like me) have written
some papers, in an ethically contested
landscape? Is it even when ethicists agree
among themselves, whether or not
engagement with the scientific community
or robust and inclusive public engage-
ment has occurred? The key purpose of
democratic institutions and procedures
is to guarantee public engagement in
lawmaking; one should therefore question
whether ethics, without engagement,
should have the force of law without
having undergone its democratic rigors
(Taylor, 2007). Justice Story would have
complained in stronger terms and held
that retrospective ethics, even if delivered
by government, are an oppression that
Magna Carta and the schisms of the
Reformation and Restoration had taughtCell 4, June 5, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 481
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extreme, however. When Lo et al. (2004)
and others wrote seminal papers elevating
our conception of required consent, they
were saying new and important things,
not just describing an existing consensus.
It took time for bodies like the NAS and
ISSCR to discuss and develop consent
guidelines, while IRBs were meanwhile
acting to protect donors by adapting and
applying federally promulgated regula-
tions long in the making. Thirty days notice
and comment after rule development is
not the same as years of deliberation and
engagement before rule development.
The NIH proposal, while partly foreshad-
owed in the Clinton era, is only weeks
old, and the Clinton-era proposal was
one version among others contending for
approval. I think, therefore, that the novel
terms contained within the proposed rules
are neither sufficiently established nor
created through sufficient past engage-
ment to warrant retroactive application.
Conclusion
The proposed rules should be modified.
They should not be retroactive. Grants
awarded previously should be continued,
and Presidential lines ought to be eligible
for funding. Funding should be permitted
for ESC lines created previously if
approved by IRBs or ESCROs under the
standards then applicable, and for new
cell lines derived from embryos donated
ethically under IRB-approved protocols
and then-existing standards, including482 Cell Stem Cell 4, June 5, 2009 ª2009 Ethe NAS and ISSCR guidelines. The rules
ought to allow the Sugarman/Siegel/Lo
framework to operate: the NIH should
permit contextual evidence of adherence
to ethically core principles, including for
research using lines that originate outside
the U.S.
Rules and guidelines will often trail
rapidly developing science (Rugg-Gunn
et al., 2009; Marchant and Pope, 2009).
To justify the retroactive application of
new rules to scientists, institutions, and
donors, proposed changes should be
held to an ethical consensus that is suffi-
cientlyestablished, inclusive,and attentive
to democratic protections, and that meets
squarely each of the concerns outlined
above. Those concerns should create a
presumption against retroactivity espe-
cially in rapidly developing and ethically
contested fields of science, for it is
precisely in that arena that debate must
be encouraged, but without fear of unfair
retroactivity. All rules should be subject
to exceptions—atrocities should always
prompt swift action—but precisely
because of the clear moral footing of the
objection. The varying, good-faith versions
of existing, and proposed, appropriate
stem cell consent do not fall into the cate-
gory of morally objectionable.
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